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Introduction  
The meaning of “economic activity” for the purposes of VAT has been considered by various courts 
on several occasions and some divergence between the decisions of the UK courts and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was apparent. The determination of whether an economic 
activity has taken place is critical for VAT purposes, and particularly relevant for charities which 
often operate very much on the borderline. The Court of Appeal decision in Longridge on Thames v 
HMRC (Longridge)1. In a decision that has potentially wide reaching impacts on charities, the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Longridge on Thames v HMRC (Longridge)2 has provided some 
welcome clarity on the issue. 
The Facts in Longridge  
Longridge on the Thames was a charity which offered water-based activities (for both recreational 
and education purposes) to the public. As well as providing resources for the activities themselves, 
Longridge also offered related tuition. Its activities were available to all, although the centre primarily 
targeted young people. It did not provide these services without charge, but prices varied according to 
the ability of the consumer to pay. Any shortfall was met from donations and other receipts.  
Longridge was not registered for VAT and so did not charge VAT on its activities. However, 
following the construction of a new building, it had been required to pay £135,000 of VAT in respect 
of the building services. Longridge argued that, as the building was intended for use solely for 
charitable purposes, the building services should be zero-rated under schedule 8 of the VATA 1994.3 
If the building services were zero-rated, Longridge would be able to recover any input taxes 
attributable to the construction of the building. HMRC decided that Longridge were not able to rely 
on schedule 8, since their activities constituted an “economic activity” (the building will only be zero 
rated if it is used solely for a relevant charitable purpose, and this is not the case if an economic 
activity is also taking place) and Longridge appealed.  
Legislative background 
Article 9(1) of the European Community Council Directive 2006/112/EC (hereafter the “Principal 
VAT Directive”) provides for VAT to be charged on the supply of goods for consideration by a 
taxable person. A “taxable person’ “shall mean any person who, independently, carries out in any 
place any economic activity, whatever the purpose or results of that activity.” 4 (emphasis added). 
VAT was implemented in the UK by what is now the Valued Added Tax Act 1994 (VATA) which, in 
section 4(1), provides that VAT shall be charged on “a taxable supply by a taxable person in the 
course or furtherance of any business carried on by him.”5  
The difference in wording between UK and the European versions of the law might explain in part the 
fact that there were, leading up to Longridge,6 two different interpretations in the case law of when 
there is a taxable person for VAT purposes: one in EU law, and one in domestic law.  However, the 
difference in wording is dealt with swiftly in Longridge, which makes the obvious point that the 
VATA must be interpreted in line with the Principal VAT Directive and so “furtherance of any 
                                                          
1 Longridge on Thames v HMRC (Longridge) [2016] EWCA Civ 930 (CA). 
2 Above fn.1; [2016] EWCA Civ 930 (CA). 
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business” is interchangeable with “economic activity” (in the sense that they should both achieve the 
same result).7 The appeal compares and considers the two lines of case law; one concerned with 
“business” and the other with “economic activity”.  
Background 
CJEU jurisprudence 
Longridge placed considerable reliance on the 2009 decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), 
European Commission v Finland (Finland).8 Earlier ECJ decisions had already considered the 
meaning of economic activity, so we already knew that there is economic activity where a supply is 
continuous and for remuneration9 or consideration,10  and there is a direct link between the service 
provided and the consideration given.11 However, more detailed consideration was given to these 
matters in Finland.  
In this case, the Finnish Government argued that the legal aid services that it suppled were not an 
economic activity and therefore not subject to VAT. Although a contribution was payable towards 
legal aid depending on the income of the recipient, such contributions did not come close to covering 
the costs of the provision of the legal services provided.   The ECJ noted that an activity is an 
economic activity where it is “permanent and is carried out in return for remuneration which is 
received by the person carrying out the activity”.12 This the ECJ referred to as the “general rule”.  
However, it also noted that there must be a direct link between the service and the payment received13 
and it was decided that there was no such link as the legal aid contribution was not dependent solely 
on the cost of the service but also on the income of the recipient. Consequently, there was no 
economic activity.14 The implication of Finland is that the mere fact that a person receives income 
from an activity does not on its own make that activity “economic”.  
Domestic jurisprudence 
It is evident that the UK courts have adopted an interpretation of economic activity which is wider 
than the approach adopted by the ECJ in that it allows additional factors to be taken into 
consideration. The Court of Appeal considered four decisions of the UK courts. The first case it 
referred to was Customs and Excise Commissioners v Morrison’s Academy Boarding Houses 
Association (Morrison’s Academy),15 which considered the marks of a business activity: 
“[H]ow would this activity be properly described without any reference to the issues of tax 
liability? I think the answer would be that it is essentially a business activity of a very usual and 
normal kind. It has every mark of a business activity: it is regular, conducted on sound and 
recognised business principles, with a structure which can be recognised as providing a familiar 
constitutional mechanism for carrying on a commercial undertaking, and it has as its declared 
purpose the provision of goods and services which are of a type provided and exchanged in 
course of everyday life and commerce.”16 
                                                          
7 Above fn.1; [2016] EWCA Civ 930 (CA) at [14]. 
8 European Commission v Finland (Finland) (Case C-246/08) [2009] ECR 1-10605 (ECJ). 
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 These marks of a business activity were then collated in the case of Customs & Excise Commissioners 
v Lord Fisher (Fisher),17 which highlighted six factors paraphrased as follows:18 
 
1. A ‘serious undertaking earnestly pursued’; 
2. A reasonable or recognisable continuity; 
3. A measure of substance in regards to the annual taxable supplies – i.e. the volume of the 
supplies; 
4. An activity that is conducted regularly on sound business principles; 
5. A predominant concern for making taxable supplies for consideration; 
6. The supplies are of a kind that are usually made for profit.  
 
These factors allow the context surrounding the activity to be explored and go beyond the test applied 
in Finland.19 Fisher was built upon in HMRC v Yarburgh Children’s Trust (Yarburgh)20 which went 
further and considered the charitable purpose as “relevant to a consideration of whether the 
organisation in question can seriously be regarded as doing anything more than the carrying out of its 
charitable functions.”21 This approach was approved and followed in HMRC v St Paul’s Community 
Project Limited (St Paul’s),22 in the sense that the economic activity was determined by reference to 
the charity’s predominant concern: i.e. that there was a charitable purpose. Following these domestic 
cases, it was therefore possible for a charitable activity to not be a business activity if a charitable 
purpose was the charity’s predominant concern. 
 
The practical effect of these decisions, of course, is that relative to EU law, the UK approach indicates 
a wider understanding of the scope of activities that fall outside the definition of an economic activity 
for VAT purposes and which are consequently not subject to VAT.  
 
Decision of the FTT 
The question put before the FTT was whether Longridge was carrying out an economic activity in its 
general activities. First, the FTT referred to the case of Commission v Netherlands,23 which states that 
whether there is an economic activity is an objective test, and consideration of the additional factors 
of the purpose or results of the activity is irrelevant. However, the FTT then applied the 
considerations that were applied in Yarburgh,24 and so looked objectively at whether there was an 
economic activity with reference to the entirety of the activity and the context surrounding the 
activity. The factors in Fisher25 were also considered, and the tribunal specifically considered the fact 
that Longridge was receiving consideration for the services that it provides; that there was a business-
like manner in its running; the charges made were according to commercially recognisable terms and 
conditions; and, Longridge had a significant turnover. These factors, however, were not enough to 
label the activities as economic activities. Instead, the FTT considered (amongst other things)  
- the discounts offered to those who could not afford the full price;  
- the charges set with a view to cover operational expenses only;  
- the possibility of waiving or reducing charges where there is a charitable interest to do so;  
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18 Fisher, above fn.17; [1981] STC 238 at [245]. 
19 Finland (C-246/08), above fn.8; [2009] ECR 1-10605. 
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- that all capital projects are financed by donations;  
- that volunteers run the activities.26  
In the FTT’s view, “these are not factors which are indicative of a business”.27 After balancing the 
Fisher28 criteria and Yarburgh,29 the FTT decided that Longridge’s “predominant concern” is 
charitable30 and, as such, it is not carrying on an economic activity.  
Decision of the Upper-Tribunal (UT)31 
Before the UT, HMRC relied heavily on Finland, which was not cited to the FTT. It argued that there 
is an economic activity if there is a permanent activity carried out for remuneration. HMRC also 
argued that motive for profit was not relevant to the concept of an economic activity; and, as a result, 
that no analysis of the costs charged by Longridge for its services should take place. It was also 
submitted that Yarburgh32 and St Paul’s33 were no longer good law, following the decision in Finland. 
The UT considered domestic and CJEU cases. It noted that a distinction had to be made between two 
types of activities: first, those that amounted to the furtherance of a business even though there was no 
motive for profit (following Morrison’s Academy34) and, second, activities which were not conducted 
as a business even though there was consideration (following Finland35). It noted that it was a 
question of fact for the FTT to decide which of these types of activities were being conducted here. As 
the FTT has looked at the totality of the features of the activities, it had not erred in law. In addition, 
the UT decided that Finland had not narrowed the test for economic activity to the point that 
Yarburgh36 and St Paul’s37 were no longer applicable.  
HMRC appealed to the Court of Appeal.  
Decision of the Court of Appeal 
Counsel for Longridge continued to argue that the wider context of the activity was relevant in the 
determination of whether it was an economic activity. It was accepted that the meaning is an objective 
one, but, nonetheless, the court should take into account the wider context seen within Yarburgh38 and 
St Paul’s.39 In other words, “to decide whether a person supplying services is engaged in economic 
activity one is entitled to take into account those terms and features which lead one to conclude that 
the manner in which the activities are undertaken is different from that which would be undertaken by 
someone engaged in activity in that activity in the ordinary course of the market.”40 
On the other hand, and the important point of the appeal, counsel for HMRC argued that unless it can 
be proven that there is no direct link between the service and the consideration, there will be an 
                                                          
26 Longridge on the Thames v Revenue and Customs Commissioners (Longridge (FTT)) [2013] UKFTT 158 
(TC) at [99]- [101]. 
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40 Longridge, above fn.1, [2016] EWCA Civ 930 (CA) at [49]. 
economic activity.41 HMRC also argued that the general rule (where a supply is continuous and for 
remuneration it will constitute an economic activity) needed to be applied. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, it was also argued that the domestic law and the criteria in Fisher42 were only guidance, 
and could not override the principles established in both Götz43 and Finland.44 
Longridge was decided in favour of the HMRC. In coming to this decision, Arden LJ and Morgan J 
worked through the ECJ and domestic case law, balancing them to come to the meaning of economic 
activity. This need for interpretation at CA level highlights the previous difficulties encountered in 
attributing a meaning to these words.  
There is no special rule for charities.45 An activity can also be deemed an economic activity even if 
the activity is not profitable.46 Arden LJ reiterated that the test for an economic activity is an objective 
one;47 and it is generally assumed that an activity is an economic one if “it is permanent and is carried 
out in return for remuneration by the person carrying out the activity”.48 In addition, there must be a 
direct link between the remuneration received and the activity.49 In this case, the fact that Longridge 
had charitable concerns were irrelevant to the objective test, and were not enough to convert what 
would otherwise be an economic activity into a non-economic activity. In terms of a direct link, the 
CA agreed with the findings of fact of the FTT – that the amount charged by Longridge for the 
services was “more than nominal”, and as such there is a direct link.50 Arden LJ considered that the 
domestic jurisprudence outlined above now diverges from these European law principles. A clear 
example of this is seen in the focus on a direct link in Finland,51 which is nowhere to be seen within 
the Fisher52 criteria.53   
Morgan J considered the role of “predominant concern” as applied in Yarburgh54 and St Paul’s55. 
Again, the domestic law is considered in a negative light following CJEU jurisprudence and is 
labelled as “unhelpful” and “misleading”.56 This demonstrates yet another move away from the 
domestic jurisprudence, and an acceptance of the objective test in Finland.57 A list of general 
propositions is also created by Morgan J which provides a useful if not particularly innovative 
summary of the points within Finland.58  
Comment 
What this case brings to the ‘economic activity table’ appears to be an application of Finland59 which 
limits the role of domestic jurisprudence. Arden LJ’s stated that factors developed by domestic case 
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“cannot displace the approach required by CJEU jurisprudence”. Whilst the decision adds little to 
what has already been stated in Finland it does add clarity in terms of the approach to be taken. The 
correct approach is that there is an economic activity if there is a direct link between the consideration 
and the service, with direct link construed narrowly – it does not allow for the consideration of 
motives, or wider contextual considerations. As such, any criteria that existed before in the domestic 
jurisprudence, have now been subsumed into a general rule: a permanent supply for consideration. 
Other definitions in VAT law, for instance consideration,60 have already been defined in CJEU 
jurisprudence, and this area of domestic law might be regarded as having being overdue in its 
consideration of EU law. Fisher,61 for example, did not apply the ECJ meaning of economic activity, 
but instead considered a number of factors which indicated the presence of a business activity. 
Longridge62 could be considered as a clean-up operation to bring the domestic law into line with the 
European jurisprudence. 
The practical impact of this decision is that it is difficult to see when a permanent activity of supply 
for consideration would not be an economic activity, unless one is faced with factual circumstances 
that are akin to Finland.63 It was argued by Arden LJ that “there will be cases where the activities of 
an organisation such as a charity, providing services at a concessionary rate, do not amount to 
economic activity”.64 Yet, this writer finds it difficult to imagine how this would be the case unless 
the concessions represented a very small amount of the costs of the service, and were indexed to 
external factors (such as means testing in Finland). As such, most charities will not find any 
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